











































I Don't Need an Expert! Making URL Phishing Features Human
Comprehensible
Citation for published version:
Althobaiti, K, Meng, N & Vaniea, KE 2021, I Don't Need an Expert! Making URL Phishing Features Human
Comprehensible. in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI
'21)., 695, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 1-17, The ACM CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems 2021, Virtual Conference, Japan, 8/05/21.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3411764.3445574
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1145/3411764.3445574
Link:




Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '21)
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Aug. 2021
















Judging the safety of a URL is something that even security experts
struggle to do accurately without additional information. In this
work, we aim to make experts’ tools accessible to non-experts and
assist general users in judging the safety of URLs by providing
them with a usable report based on the information profession-
als use. We designed the report by iterating with 8 focus groups
made up of end users, HCI experts, and security experts to ensure
that the report was usable as well as accurately interpreted the
information. We also conducted an online evaluation with 153 par-
ticipants to compare different report-length options. We find that
the longer comprehensive report allows users to accurately judge
URL safety (93% accurate) and that summaries still provide benefit
(83% accurate) compared to domain highlighting (65% accurate).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Determining if a link (URL) in a communication is malicious phish-
ing designed to trick users or not is something that even security
experts struggle to do without the aid of tools and additional in-
formation. While looking at the URL text is a good first step, fully
reading a URL and determining its actual destination is surprisingly
complex and often requires the help of third-party services that
provide information like how long ago the domain was registered
or if the URL redirects anywhere. Yet, despite these complexities,
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URLs remain one of the stronger indicators of malicious communi-
cation [52, 62], particularly if a communication claims to come from
an organization but the URLs lead to other destinations. For exam-
ple, an email claiming to be from PayPal but containing links to
PayPal-com-security-website.org is quite likely a malicious email.
While the example is simple, it brings up several key issues with
detecting malicious links. First off, it requires that the person mak-
ing the judgment knows PayPal’s correct URL and is also able to
compare it to the one in the email. The “correct” URL for a website
is not necessarily obvious; for example, which of the following is
the correct website for the New York Times newspaper: nyt.com
or newyorktimes.com? The answer is that both URLs redirect to the
real URL www.newyorktimes.com. Comparing URLs is also not neces-
sarily easy. End users often confuse elements of a URL, such as the
domain and subdomain [2] making comparing URLs error-prone.
Experts handle these complexities using a range of tools and infor-
mation sources that help them make decisions, but end users are
often only provided with training on lexical reading [43, 74, 82] and
possibly a tool checks if the URL has been confirmed as malicious.
In this work, we aim to change this situation by making the types
of approaches used by experts more accessible to end users.
Obviously users are not the best first option to detect phishing.
Automated phishing filters are far less expensive and also relatively
accurate [40]. They can quickly compare a URL to lists of known
phishing or break the URL into features used to classify it as phish-
ing or not. Most organizations already use automated approaches
to protect users on their networks with great success. However,
this usage means that any phishing communications a user sees has
likely already been through an automated filter and therefore has
already been scanned against common computer-friendly features.
Assisting users in making these judgments on their own is neces-
sary because automated approaches are not yet 100% accurate [61]
and experts are also typically not available to consult on every
potential phishing communication in a timely manner. Phishing
communication also often uses tactics to pressure the user into
responding quickly such as threatening to shut down their account,
charge them money, upset their boss, or lose out on a limited time
offer [55, 86]. These time pressures make it emotionally hard for
users to report the email and then wait for an official response,
leading them to use their own or their peers’ judgment [56]. The
effects are readily apparent in public phishing reports. Phishing is
regularly listed as one of the top causes of data breaches (93%) [80]
and the most frequent Internet crimes complaint to the FBI [21].
Financial losses from phishing can also be expensive, exceeding
$29 million in 2017 [32] and $1.7 billion in 2019 [21]. Tools sup-
porting users in accurately making such decisions on their own are
CHI ’21, May 8–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan Althobaiti, Meng and Vaniea, et al.
therefore needed. So when providing users with support we need
to think beyond simply telling them if something is phishing or
not and instead focus on helping them leverage their contextual
knowledge of the situation in conjunction with available data to
reach a decision.
When judging the safety of a URL, experts generally have more
experience and data sources to draw from but at the end they look
for discrepancies in the data and their expectations [84]. They can
collect the data using tools like WHOIS (ICANN’s domain lookup)
to learn about the registered domain owner or understand the im-
plications of a links up-time and popularity. However, using such
tools requires an impressive amount of both access to information
and knowledge about how to interpret them. Each URL case also
requires a slightly different set of information sources and knowl-
edge, making training users to make such judgments on their own
overly burdensome.
Our goal is to support end users, so that they can engage in
some of the informed reasoning experts currently use when they
want to decide on a URL’s safety. More specifically, we want to take
existing information sources along with knowledge about how to
interpret those sources and use it to help end user decision making.
To do so, we started with a grid-based report structure inspired
by the Privacy Nutrition Labels work by Kelly et al. [38]. The grid
presents the user with information about the URL, drawn from
existing research on the URL features that are likely to be the most
useful to humans [5], and is annotated with explanations aimed
at helping users interpret the information. We then iterated on
its design with the assistance of 8 focus groups consisting of end
users, security experts, and design experts to simplify the interface
and improve the explanation of features. After we created a stable
design, we analyzed what it would look like on 4640 URLs from
two phishing datasets and two safe URL datasets. The goal was to
determine if there was any redundant information on the report
and also if the features we chose do generally align with the safety
state of the URLs. Finally, we ran a user study with 153 Prolific
users to determine if they could correctly understand the report
contents and make accurate safety judgments.
We found that focus group participants saw how such a report
could be useful in cases where they were unsure about a communi-
cation. The later focus groups also found the report design useful
and informative. Final versions of the report featured only show-
ing relevant information, and colors to help users know where
to focus. In our analysis of how the report would look with real
URLs we found that for most URLs the report only needed to show
about 7 of the 23 possible information rows, greatly limiting the
user’s reading burden. The colors also tended to align with the URL
being phishing or not. The online participants and focus group
participants exhibited similar interpretations of the various report
elements, suggesting that our richer focus group data was a good
representation of what Prolific users also thought.
2 DECIDING IF A URL GOES WHERE THE
USER THINKS IT GOES
Phishing communication often works by convincing the user that
the message they received is from a legitimate group they want to
interact with. Examples include: their bank, their IT department,
their email provider, their gaming account, or a lottery site they
just won money on. Attackers are also often interested in account
credentials, so it is useful for them tomimic existing services to trick
users into entering their credentials or providing other sensitive
data that the user might normally only give to a trusted party. One
side effect of this approach is that the user has strong expectations of
where they think they are going when they click on any links. The
other side effect is that, except in very rare situations, the attacker
does not have access to the company’s real URL and instead must
setup a fake one, so the URL the user clicks on is owned by someone
other than the group the user thinks they are interacting with.
In a review of URL phishing features used by humans and by
automated systems, Althobaiti et al. [5] observed that the domain
part of the URL is the most used feature in human-based detection
because they can compare it against their expectations. It is less
useful for computers because the computer has to guess if the
URL matches the content of the communication. The problem is
that while theoretically combining the domain with contextual
knowledge should make phishing easy to detect by humans, in
practice, people struggle to accurately parse URLs [2], making
comparison extra challenging.
2.1 Mouse over the link and look at the URL
One common piece of advice users are given is to mouse over links
in communications and look at where they go [33, 54, 68]. This is
good advice, especially in cases where the URL is very different from
expectations such as an email, supposedly from PayPal, containing
a moonstone235432.net link. But the advice gets harder to follow if
the attacker uses any of a wide range of tricks [22, 26, 49, 89].
Figure 1: Example URL along with its structure.
As Figure 1 shows, a URL is made up of many elements which
impact its destination and can be easy for end users to confuse.
For phishing, the most important element to look at is the host
name, particularly the domain [12, 20, 39, 43, 45, 74, 90]. This part
of the URL controls what server will be contacted to fetch the
page, essentially, who controls the page. In order to divert the
user to a page they control, the attacker must specify their own
domain and use tricks to make it look legitimate. We detail some
of the tricks here and refer the reader for a more comprehensive
overview [6, 22, 26, 64].
The simplest and oldest approach is using a complicated looking
domain name like the raw IP address, hex or decimals characters
instead of the real one [26, 47]. A slightly more advanced approach
is to pick a domain that looks visibly similar to the real one, but is
actually different [26, 49, 78, 89]. Even skilled security experts have
difficulties with this kind of deception [17, 24]. For example, in so-
called homograph attacks English characters are substituted with
identical looking UTF8-encoded characters from different alphabets
such as páypal.com and paypal.com [22, 25, 69]. Another example of
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a look alike attack is misspelling (typosquatting). A classic example
is substituting characters like ‘vv’ for ‘w’ or capital ‘I’ for lowercase
‘L’ which look identical with a sans-serif font [69, 76]. These two
types of look alike attacks, while dangerous, are very popular and
hard to detect by current industry anti-phishing tools [65, 77].
Another trick is to leverage users’ inability to differentiate be-
tween URL components [22]. For example, Albakry et al. [2] found
that users cannot differentiate between a company name in the
subdomain vs. the domain of a URL. Similarly, Reynolds et al. [69]
found that users struggle to correctly parse URLs, but have high
self-confidence in their ability to interpret URLs. A dangerous com-
bination that helps attackers. A common trick involves putting a
brand name into an incorrect position, such as in the subdomain
(e.g. amazon.evil.com), path (e.g. evil.com/amazon), search string
(e.g. evil.com?amazon), or even username (e.g. amazon@evil.com). A
similar trick is to swap out the top-level domain (TLD) such as
amazon.evil instead of amazon.com [71] or put a fake TLD into a
subdomain (amazon.com.evil.com).
2.2 What is the “correct” URL anyway?
The ability to compare a URL in a communication with the “correct”
domain for that organization is a major factor in determining if a
URL is legitimate or not. Unfortunately, it is surprisingly hard to
determine which domains are associated with a given organization.
Large companies will typically use a domain name that matches
their brand name; e.g, CNN uses cnn.com and Chase Bank uses
chase.com. But some organizations select domains that are not nec-
essarily obvious; for example, Fifth Third Bank has a domain of
53.com which relates to its brand, but is not immediately obviously
the correct URL. Often, companies also have multiple domains asso-
ciated with their brand such as Mirosoft which owns microsoft.com,
live.com, and xbox.com some of which are not obviously Microsoft
domains from their text. There are several good reasons why a
company might have multiple domains such as having multiple
product lines, or registering “defensive domains” to protect their
customers from both typing errors and attackers.
Organizations can also have similar names to other organiza-
tions, which makes it challenging for users to know what domain
name to compare against. For example, many banks share the name
“Citizen’s Bank” resulting in a confusing array of both bank names
and URLs. Citizen’s Bank (citizens-bank.org) and Citizen’s Bank
(citizenbank.bank) are two different banks which are not to be con-
fused with Charter One Bank (citizensbankonline.com) which is
owned by another Citizen’s Bank (citizensbank.com). The point
here is that it is not trivial to just look at a domain name and
associate it with a particular organization.
Finally, websites that host others’ content can make the situation
even more confusing. For example, windows.net is owned by Mi-
crosoft but is a content hosting site. That is, people pay Microsoft
for web space and then can create websites like evil.windows.net
which are then hosted from a Microsoft-owned domain [15]. The
result is a phishing site that is linked to a real Microsoft domain but
where the content of the page is actually controlled by attackers.
2.3 Redirects and Short URLs
While the domain shown in a clicked URL is often the same as
the final destination URL, that is not always true. Organizations
commonly do minor redirects such as adding ‘www’. Some may
also redirect to their preferred brand such as nyt.com redirecting
to www.nytimes.com. More challenging are URLs that obscure the
real URL completely making the URL’s destination impossible to
predict without assistance [13, 28]. Examples include URL short-
ening services (e.g. bit.ly) [8], QR codes, and URL-rewriting by
email servers (e.g. safelinks.protection.outlook.com). Thankfully,
users do seem to be aware that they cannot predict the destination
of shortened URLs [2].
3 RELATEDWORK
Research on preventing phishing attacks has adopted three com-
plementary approaches: automating phishing detection, educating
users about phishing, and supporting users’ decisions with security
indicators. A full review of automated phishing detection is outside
the scope of this paper, though we review some of the features in
Section 5. We present a brief overview of the other areas.
3.1 User Training
Humans are the last point of defense for organizations as detecting
phishing emails requires humans awareness of the context in which
they received the phishing message, such as who they expect to re-
ceive the message from and which website they expect to visit [84].
Experts, for example, identify phishing emails by hovering over
links, looking at sender emails address, and other technical informa-
tion of the email; they typically learn to look at these features from
training materials [84]. Training average users to identify phishing
messages is a common approach which is often combined with
automatic detection [9, 12, 43, 74]. On average, organizations spend
about $290k every year on training [73], which is often either done
upfront [12, 74] or embedded in daily work [45].
Upfront training explains concepts in a dedicated training ses-
sion. Its effectiveness depends on the user’s ability to recall and
apply these learned lessons in later situations, which can be chal-
lenging since people tend to forget unused information [18, 64],
necessitating periodical training [34]. Even if they can remember, at-
tackers also continuously adjust their tactics over time, invalidating
some of the learned information [5, 22].
Embedded training is designed to be integrated into users’ daily
routines, such as receiving training if they fall for phishing attacks.
While effective [75], embedded training is costly with the need for
a human administrator’s time to craft simulated phishing commu-
nications [63] that must also be realistic and up to date [31, 40].
Even if training could improve users’ ability to detect phishing
websites, URLs can be manipulated in ways that are not easily
discernible by the human eye. No amount of training will solve
these issues because of humans’ physical limitations [12, 17]. Con-
sequently, while phishing education does offer skills people need
to improve their phishing detection abilities, they are unlikely to
be able to discern challenging URLs without the assistance of tools
which are not currently easy to find or use [5].
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3.2 Phishing detection support
In phishing detection support, a computer assists the user by pro-
viding extra information or comparing the URL to known labeled
ones. These support systems can take several forms, e.g., browser
warnings, chatbots, and toolbars. This collaborative approach is
suggested to be complimentary by Park et al. [61] who argue that
through utilizing the complementary strengths of a human and an
agent, we can achieve the results we desire.
Several existing tools provide phishing-detection support for
users. Netcraft’s browser plugin [48] warns users about blacklisted
webpages once they visited them; as well as clearly displaying the
website’s country, site rank, hostname, and other facts to help users
identify fraudulent URLs. SpoofStick presents the domain name in
the browser toolbar to highlight cases where there is a legitimate-
looking domain name in a wrong position [88]. Yang et al. also
designed security warnings based on website traffic ranks [91]. The
Faheem chat bot [6] provides basic facts about any given URL;
including the existence of misspellings, non-ASCII characters and
redirection. Users can also ask the bot to elaborate on any term and
receive a longer explanation. TORPEDO [82], a Thunderbird add-
on, presents and highlights the domain of a URL linked in hypertext
on a email. The add-on will disable the links for 3 seconds so users
stop and think about the URL safety.
The above security indicators take a similar approach to our
proposed report. We are presenting the user with information about
the URL prior to visiting it under the assumption that with support,
they will have the ability to identify unexpected aspects of the link.
Our work differs from existing solutions in that it focuses on how to
express potentially complex URL and web hosting concepts to users
in an easy-to-comprehend way. Existing solutions either focus on
providing support to more technical users who may already have a
strong lexicon of internet terms like “host”, “domain” and “hosting
provider” or providing basic support that does not add much to the
upfront user training. Our work is aimed at bringing this type of
information to a broader audience.
4 DESIGN GOALS
From the above related work we can see that there are three large
problems that need to be solved: 1) human judgment is needed
to determine if a URL is safe because the human has contextual
knowledge that is not available to the computer, 2) URLs are made
up of a large number of components that are hard to parse correctly
and contain information like certificates and redirects that require
computer assistance to read, and finally, 3) there are many disparate
data repositories that contain data pertinent to URL trustworthiness,
e.g. DNS records of registration dates and phishing feed lists of
known malicious URLs, which have a wide range of interfaces and
locations making them non-trivial to use.
Therefore, as mentioned in Section 2, to judge a URL correctly
a large range of URL features is required. For humans, the most
indicative feature is the domain since they understand the context
in which they see the URL and understand which organization’s
domain they would expect [5]. But predicting the destination of
URLs is non-trivial. So, to best assist users in this task, we drew
inspiration from the privacy policy nutrition label work by Kelly et
al. [38] where a large number of privacy policy elements were put
into a food nutrition label like format. We thought that a similar
approach might show important URL features to users in a consis-
tent format that might allow them to learn over time. Thus, our
goal is to develop a “URL nutrition label”, including framing URL
information in a way that assists users in leveraging their contex-
tual knowledge and expectations to judge if a given URL belongs
to the organization they expect. We call our design a URL feature
report. Our report aims to address the following key design goals:
A. Comprehensive. The report should include enough infor-
mation to help users make an informed decision about the
safety of almost all URLs, including the ones in Section 2. To
avoid overloading users, the interface should also present
only necessary information [60].
B. Support knowledge acquisition. Each phishing indicator
needs to have an explanation that helps non-experts un-
derstand the information as well as support higher level
reasoning about it [16].
C. Promote confidence. Users need to have confidence in
their final decision in order for the report to have its intended
impact. Therefore, the report should support users in con-
fidently making decisions on their own rather than blindly
trusting recommendations. We aim to support users’ confi-
dence by providing conceptual and procedural knowledge
(know-how) when explaining the phishing indicators [7, 53].
D. Inspire Trust. The report should inspire users to trust it by
regularly providing accurate information and explaining its
recommendations in a way that a user can verify themselves.
Building trust with users when they need help will also
improve their acceptance to taking the help [41, 67].
E. Support comparisons. The report should allow users to
compare the aspects of the report to their own understanding
and, potentially, against reports of other URLs. Supporting
comparisons makes it easier for people to use the report for
their tasks, the consistent positioning of information also
allows them to learn the location of data for faster future
access [38]. For example, a user may bank with Skrill and
sees on the report that the domain is registered to an address
on the Isle of Man, unsure if that is correct or not, they also
ask for a report on Skrill’s main website to see if it is also
registered to the Isle of Man.
5 DESIGNING THE INITIAL REPORT
Reading a URL andmaking an accurate judgment requires accessing
a wide variety of URL facts as well as understanding what those
facts mean. These facts are consistent between URLs. As part of our
design goals, we focus on selecting features that will help people
most in making informed decisions about URL safety and how to
present them to users. For an initial list, we started with the findings
of Althobaiti et al. who reviewed phishing features used in human-
training and automated detection research [5]. We then narrowed
the list down to features that had been shown to be robust and had
the potential to be human-friendly. We also excluded features that
were highly technical and could not be combined with contextual
knowledge to make informed decisions, for example, the DNS-based
features [5].
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Table 1: The threshold for the features used in the URL re-
port. ‘-’ means that the row will not be shown in that situ-
ation. Features were also added (⋆) and removed (⋆⋆) from
the report due to design iteration changes.
Feature Red Yellow Green
Facts Domain - - -
(mostly Category ⋆ Malicious Web-host -
neutral) Registrar Location ⋆ - - -
Facts Domain Popularity - < 300K < 150k
PageRank - 0-3 4-10
Domain Age < 3 M < 6 M ≥ 6 M
In Search Engine No match Partial match Match
Encryption ⋆⋆ - Unencrypted -
Tricks No. of External Domains > 4 2-4 -
No. of Short URLs in Chain - > 1 -
Blacklisted in Chain >0 - -
IP Address 1 - -
Non-standard Port - 1 -
No. of Subdomains > 4 3-4 -
Credential in Host 1 - -
Has Unicode ‘%’ 1 - -
Hex Code in Host 1 - -
Non-ASCII Mixed lang. Non-ASCII -
Out-of-position TLD A token - -
Out-of-position Protocol A token - -
Out-of-position ‘www’ A token A sub-token -
Top Targeted in subdomain A token A sub-token -
Similarity to Top Targeted - 1 -
Similarity to Alexa Top 10k - 1 -
To present the features in a comparable, well-arranged format
as required by our design goals A and E, we split our initial design
into four sections (See Figure 2).
5.1 Notice and reminder
On the top of the report we show the URL that was asked about
for reference. For URLs that redirect, we display both the requested
URL and the one that would be redirected to if they clicked the link.
We also check the URL against known malicious URLs and clearly
state if it is already known to be safe or malicious.
PhishTank and Google Safe Browsing both provide lists of re-
ported malicious URLs, approved by security communities, which
could be used to automatically alert a user [30, 79].
On the other hand, the Extended Validation Certificate (EV cer-
tificate) is used tomark a URL as safe because it indicates that a site’s
ownership has been verified by a certificate authority, which is suf-
ficient evidence [51]. For other URLs, neither blacklisted nor with a
verified owner, the safety is unknown. Thus, we avoid false positives
and inspire trust in the report’s safety information (Goal D).
5.2 Facts
In this section, we provide more details about the website’s URL
features to help users decide whether this domain indeed belongs
to the expected institution or not. Each fact is presented with a
fact name in bold on the left followed by a short description and
the value on the right (Goal B). This section has the most consis-
tent structure; however, we only show relevant features to achieve
goal A of being comprehensive without overloading the users. Red
text is used to both highlight potential issues as well as provide
guidance as to what the problem might be. For example, in the
initial design, a Google PageRank of 0 is low suggesting that the
page is probably not apple.com.
The first and foremost indicative feature is the domain itself. If
the user is able to detect that the domain is not what they expected,
they are likely to succeed in avoiding the attack. We adopted the
common advice to search for the company’s name in Google and
look at the top few results. This works well because most modern
search engines use popularity as an ordering metric [74].
Two more revealing components are the relative popularity of
a website, which we determine using Alexa’s most popular do-
mains [4, 26, 50, 91], and the PageRank of a webpage [4, 26]. These
two popularity scales both imply how popular a website is, but
we present both to users because they do not always agree, most
commonly in web hosting situations. If the domain is a web host,
the Alexa popularity is the same for all pages and subdomains un-
der that domain, whereas the PageRank may differ between pages
under one domain. Finally, we use the domain age from Whois
records in our report since users can efficiently compare it to the
expected duration of the organization’s online presence.
Encryption is another hint for safety, indicating if the connection
with the server will be encrypted or not (https vs http). HTTPS adds
encryption so users’ information remains protected from unautho-
rized access in transit. Unfortunately, encryption is not a highly
reliable indication of phishing websites [57], especially, since the
introduction of LetsEncrypt [19] which gives free encryption cer-
tificates to anyone. It is, however, a useful security aspect.
5.3 Tricks
There are many ways to manipulate a URL to look legitimate. In
this section we aim at identifying and pointing out these malicious
tricks to users. Since the existence of tricks is very indicative of
phishing, we check the URL for about 16 different tricks, many of
them lexical. For example, we examine the URL for the existence of
misspelling by comparing the domain with top targeted domains
on PhishTank and Alexa’s top 10,000 domains [77]. Each identified
trick is then shown to the user as a row under the tricks section
along with both a explanation of the trick and evidence (Goal C). To
limit the length of the report, only identified tricks are shown, and
if a URL has no tricks we simply state that no tricks were found.
In addition to misspellings, we also look at mixed language use,
i.e. the existence of characters from conflicting alphabets. While
no longer popular [22], the existence of IP address, hex or deci-
mal characters often indicate phishing URLs. We also reverse IP
addresses to the human-readable domain when possible.
Other tricks used by attackers to mislead users are also specified
in our report such as the number of subdomains, ‘@’ in the host-
name, and out of position ‘http’, ‘https’, TLD, and ‘www’. We also
use the PhishTank’s top targeted brands to identify if a targeted
brand name is in the subdomain [10]. Additionally, we consider redi-
rections, including multiple chained redirection. We determine the
number of external domains [50], number of shortened URLs [29]
and blacklisted URLs in that chain [46] and flag them as suspicious
if they exceed a threshold. The full list of tricks is shown in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Our initial design of the report whichwas shown to the first focus group (left) and the final design of the report (right).
5.4 Severity colors
We use a traffic light system with symbols to draw attention to
important information. A colored circle on the far left indicates
how problematic the value is, ranging from green (no issue) to red
(known issue) whereas no symbol is provided for neutral informa-
tion such as the domain. Red indicators are restricted for reliable
features with few false positives such as an IP address in the host-
name [6, 74, 82]. At the bottom of the report is a legend explaining
the symbols and colors.
The color thresholds for each feature are adopted from automated
detection research with more restriction for red color as presented
in Table 1. The first block in the table includes context-related
elements such as the domain name, which are mostly presented
without color indicators. The second block shows facts that use
different colors while the last block lists the tricks that are displayed
when applicable in red or yellow.
We aim to support user’s decision confidence through the use of
color (Goal C). If a user sees many severe (red) color indicators in a
potentially suspicious URL, then it should reinforce their confidence
in their decision; conversely, many green rows may help them be
confident of a URL’s authenticity.
6 ITERATINGWITH FOCUS GROUPS
We conducted a set of eight focus group sessions with Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) experts, security experts, and students
from a UK university with a non-technology major. In the first
focus group we took a co-design approach, but learned that users
rationally just want the system to tell them if it is safe or not,
which cannot be accurately done. So for later groups we focused
on discussion and feedback. After each focus group, we used the
feedback to iterate on the design.
Consequently, each group saw a slightly different version of
the interface starting with the left version in Figure 2 for G1 and
ending with the right image after G8. As the FG sessions progressed,
we saw less new suggestions and more discussion of the content
and phishing itself with G7 providing only minimal improvements,
suggesting that we were reaching saturation or at least had created
a reasonably understandable design. The study complied with our
university’s ethics procedure.
6.1 Participants
Our first three focus groups consisted of experts in HCI (G1) and
security (G2, G3) (See Table 2). The purpose of these groups was
to provide expert-level advice and to ensure that our design both
matches strong HCI standards and is accurate in terms of security.
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Table 2: Focus groups including their participants’ expertise
and group size.
Group Type Size Gender
G1 HCI 3 2F, 1M
G2 Security 2 1F, 1M
G3 Security 4 4M
G4 Non-technical 4 4F
G5 Non-technical 4 3F, 1M
G6 Non-technical 5 4F, 1M
G7 Non-technical 5 5F
G8 Non-technical 5 3F, 2M
G1 and G2 were recruited from our University community. G3 was
recruited from a local security workshop and contained security ex-
perts from industry. All three groups were unpaid and participated
primarily out of interest in the project topic.
We recruited non-expert participants from The University of
Edinburgh using various email lists including students from art,
psychology, and physics while computer science and informatics
were excluded. We chose this group because students are known
for falling for these types of attacks meaning that they represent
the type of people our report should support. They also rely heavily
on the Internet for their studies [36] making them vulnerable to
malicious links [81]. They were compensated £10 for 90 minutes.
6.2 Procedure
We first provided a consent form and collected demographics via a
paper survey. In expert focus groups (G1-G3), we gave a 10 minute
presentation on phishing, our motivation for the project, and com-
mon URL manipulation tricks. The presentation was provided to
ensure all the experts are aware of the context which allowed us
to best leverage their expertise. For average users, we excluded
the URL manipulation tricks part of the presentation because we
wanted their normal reaction to the reports without a prior knowl-
edge of the tricks. As awarm up for all groups, we asked participants
to share a recent experience with phishing communications includ-
ing how they discovered that it was phishing. Doing so helped the
participants better conceptualize what “phishing” meant, while also
providing a set of concrete examples which were often referenced
in later discussions.
After the initial discussion, we handed out two sheets of paper: an
email containing a URL and the report about the URL. The email was
provided so that participants would have the contextual information
necessary to use the report. We used real non-malicious emails
previously sent to the researchers as a start-point and replaced
some of the existing URLs with malicious ones. Participants were
told to imagine that they had received the email but were worried
about it so they entered the URL into an online report generator and
got the provided report. They were first asked to use the report to
decide on their own if the message was real or phishing. Meanwhile,
they were encouraged to mark elements of the interface that they
found helpful or confusing with provided colored pens. Participants
also had access to a range of co-design style materials including
blank paper, stickers, colored pens, sticky notes, and scissors. After
everyone finished, the researcher moderated a discussion about
the report. This process was repeated with another 2-4 email and
report combinations depending on time.
6.3 Outcomes
6.3.1 Overall Impressions. Participants generally liked the re-
port, both content and design, and found themselves well sup-
ported making a decision. Initially, they wished for a clear state-
ment whether the URL is safe or not. After we explained that most
URLs cannot be definitively classified that way, they tended to un-
derstand, but the concept did not come naturally. A G6 member,
for example, started with the strong view that safe/unsafe presen-
tation would be best, but after being presented with a URL from
a real phishing email sent to most of the University population,
he immediately identified it as phishing and recalled that his own
anti-phishing tools had failed to identify it at the time. Our report
showed him that the URL lead to an organization located in South
Africa, which is not an expected location for a Microsoft URL.
Users had mixed opinions about the interface and its long-term
usability. Early groups found the interface overwhelming and very
long, but the perception improved through iteration on the content
and presentation. The last few groups found the interface appealing
and were even interested in using it either in their daily lives or as a
tool when uncertain about a phishing message. They described the
report as a useful tool to make a confident decision about the safety
of a URL. A member of G5 for example explained its usefulness as
“Alongside with intuition, there is relevant support and information
for me to make decision on whether to trust the website subse-
quently”. Similarly, a member of G7 explained: “I think for most
people this would provide enough information to make informed
decisions with a high level of confidence. Very interesting”.
They had varied feelings about the trustworthiness of auto-
detection tools in general. A G6 participant stated: “I trust the
machine a lot, but I will trust myself more. This interface will help
me to educate myself”. This attitude is not only in line with the goal
to support a user’s decision, but also typical of phishing training
which teaches users to not completely rely on the severity level of
the indicators but also encourages them to consider their expecta-
tions. Similarly, a participant of G7 said: “It would work for helping
classify URLs to safe and not safe. It is important to educate users
and not just trust the software of taking decisions”. Participants
were also able to learn from the report itself as a participant in G7
described: “I learned to prioritize the results”.
6.3.2 Visual Appearance and Interaction.
Symbols and Colors. Over the course of the focus groups, we
adjusted the use and prominence of symbols and colors according
to feedback. The first group, G1, found the colored symbols in the
left column too small to read and were concerned that they would
not be sufficiently obvious to readers and have unclear meaning.
We therefore added descriptions such as “known issue” on a solid
background color to make the meaning clear (See Figure 3). In the
final design we removed these aids all together and added a legend
to just below the summary so that it would be visible when needed.
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With the new design, G2 was concerned that the colors might be
inappropriate for color-blind users and G4 mentioned that differ-
ent cultures might interpret red and green differently. In Chinese
culture, for example, red is considered a happy color. To handle
both issues, we converted to a color-blind friendly pallet and water-
marked severity symbols to clarify the meaning [35]. The final
report was tested on the iOS grayscale display which produces
a colorless version of the report and allows to evaluate how the
choice of colors would be for a colorblind person. Later focus groups
had mixed opinions about the water-marked severity indicators.
Some agreed that the symbols enhanced the meaning while others
found them distracting. Therefore, we removed them from the final
version and kept only the symbols in the legend.
Figure 3: Both images were created by a participant in G1.
The left image shows a URL with the domain, subdomain,
and additional URL components highlighted. Below is the
proposed summary with Tricks, Popularity, and Age. In the
right image, the suggested new report structure continues
with a list of tricks followed by URL facts.
Facts Order. Focus groups had several suggestions about how to
adjust the presentation order of the rows. Members of G1 suggested
we weight the presented features and present the most reliable
features at the top. Given that we wanted to present features in a
consistent order (Goal E), we instead located the strongest features
at the top and put the tricks section above the facts.
G1 also suggested that ordering the facts by color indicator,
beginning with the most severe (red) at the top. Another suggestion
was ordering them based on each feature priority. We decided
against these approaches because the relative value of facts depends
on the information only the user knows. For example, popularity
is a valuable feature if its value is unexpected, such as if the user
thinks the URL is an Apple domain, but the popularity is low.
Another suggestion by G6 was to remove non-critical (green)
facts so as to not overwhelm the user as we hide green rows for
tricks. However, a G5 participant felt that green facts were easy to
ignore if not needed. We decided against hiding green facts because
doing so would make it harder to compare reports. It might also
incorrectly make all URL reports look overly red and negative,
leading to users incorrectly rejecting good URLs.
6.3.3 Report Content. Additionally to the report interface, we
iterated over the report components and wording. After each group,
we incorporated suggestions to make the report better accessible
and understandable.
Domain and Hostname Highlighting. At the top of the report,
we highlight the URL domain to provide the domain information
together with summarizing facts. Our initial design did not include
domain highlighting since we list the domain as the first fact. How-
ever, after moving the manipulation tricks further to the top and
adding a summary, the domain is not obvious enough. Therefore,
we added domain highlighting at the top similar to how industry
tools use it. Using highlighting similar to web browsers also keeps it
familiar for non-technical users as member of G1 suggested that the
concepts of domains and subdomains is too technical and lay users
are unlikely to understand them. So the highlight in the domain
row will help the user learn about the domain aspects.
Report Summary. As mentioned before, participants of almost all
groups suggested that we provide a clear binary answer of whether
the URL is safe or not.
When G1 understood that a binary answer is not possible for all
URLs, they instead suggested an overall score or severity bar for
URLs that could be easily used for judgment. Similarly, a participant
from G3 wanted some sort of classification such as maliciousness
percentages. We felt that a single overall score would mislead users
and not encourage them to read and learn from the presented
information. Instead, we tried to use a combination of clearly visible
colors and added a summary highlighting key issues to the top of
the report to help users get the requested high-level sense safety.
Security groups G2 and G3 saw two versions of the report, one
with and one without a summary. Both thought the summary was
a good idea and debated about which topics should be included.
They liked that the summary told them which features to focus on
first. Since both expert groups considered it beneficial, we added a
summary section at the top of the report for the remaining groups
and continued to iterate on its presentation.
Several iterations later, we settled on four summary boxes: used
manipulation tricks, search result, domain age, and domain pop-
ularity. Manipulation tricks was chosen because their presence is
a strong indicator for phishing [70] and the meaning was clear to
most focus groups. The search results box indicates whether the URL
appears in Google top results when searching for it. Both domain
age and popularity are common features that made sense to users
and were generally well understood in focus groups. Groups G2
and later considered the summary to be quite useful. Initially, they
felt that such a summary definitely required the rest of the report
for explanation. However, after reading the report, they quickly
understood the meaning and had no difficulty using it when reading
future reports.
Tricks. G1 found that the tricks section is very useful, especially
the clarification of what is wrong, but the facts section did not ade-
quately explain the meaning of the information. A G1 participant
said: “If I show the tricks to my gran, she will say yeah cool, but if
show her the facts she wouldn’t know what is going on”. The tricks
are indeed a stronger indication of a malicious link, potentially
eliminating the need to look further [27]. Thus, as suggested by G1
in Figure 3, they should appear at the top. Especially since for later
groups key facts such as age already appeared in the summary.
One of the comments from G6 recommended removing the tricks
we found in a verified (safe) URLs because it will distract the users;
however, we decided that displaying tricks even for safe URLs will
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help users to learn to judge the features’ importance for making
informed judgments. For example, non-ASCII characters can occur
even in safe URLs after the evolution of Internationalized Domain
Names; thus, based on the context, users can use the feature to
judge if a URL is safe or not. This decision supports our design
goal B.
Location and Category. We added a location field to better sup-
port users in identifying any inconsistency between the domain
location and the expected location. Usually, the stated physical loca-
tion of malicious domain registrars differs from legitimate ones [70].
However, understanding the meaning of the location was challeng-
ing for focus group members with some users interpreting location
based on the trustworthiness of the country. For example, in G4
one of the participants stated: “Apple in Japan, so what? Japan is
not questionable”. She was confused and thought that the location
referred to the server location rather than the location of the orga-
nization. We thus adjusted the description to clarify that it was the
location of the domain owner.
A security expert from G3 commented that one of his common
approaches to detecting phishing websites is to look up the URL’s
category on FortiGuard which categorizes URLs into groups such
as shopping or governmental organizations. This feature can be
used to check whether a suspicious page has a similar category as
the expected one [72]. Additionally, FortiGuard categorizes the full
host name of provided URLs in case a domain includes different
subdomains such as WordPress.
Web Hosting. As mentioned previously, some popular domains
host content for others. As a result, it is possible for the domain to
be popular and registered a long time ago, but the specific page or
subdomain is malicious. Discrepancy between Domain Popularity
and PageRank should highlight this situation to users, but focus
group participants found the discrepancy confusing rather than
helpful. So mid-way through the focus groups we started experi-
menting with wordings suggested by the participants to directly
explain the issue. We tried several approaches, including dividing
the facts into page and domain facts or creating a large warning on
the top of facts. In the final design, to determine which domains
automatically offer web hosting services, we used the FortiGuard
website categorization service [23]. Then, we hide the domain-only
facts (location, age, and popularity) and in their place we state that:
“This domain hosts multiple sites, some are good and some may be
problematic. Usually only small companies and personal websites
are hosted by other domains.” In general, the focus group partici-
pants liked this warning and felt that it was very important and
useful for their decision making. G7 felt that they lacked direction
on where to look after seeing it. They understood that there might
be a problem but they were unsure how to distinguish between safe
and malicious hosted sites. Conversely, a G6 participant commented
how the warning helped him to be confident visiting personal pages
since he expected them to be hosted on other sites.
Domain Popularity and PageRank. The domain popularity is
drawn from Alexa and is an indicator of how often people visit
the domain, with the most visited domain being ranked 1. The
PageRank roughly indicates how often other pages link to this
page [11]. Here, the most linked to pages have a rank of 10. The
two measures are naturally easy to confuse as they both deal with
popularity. They also have inverted scales with 1 being good for
domain popularity and bad for PageRank. In the initial design, we
tried to explain the difference in words. However, G1 suggested a
visual range for the numbers instead to indicate clearly which value
is problematic. To further emphasize the scale, we added colors to
the range. G2 and G3 saw colored bars with raw values below and
showed no difficulties reading it. G5, however, commented that the
numbers looked like they were written in error due to the opposite
directions of the popularity scale numbers. After iterating several
approaches on later groups, we settled on removing the numbers
entirely and simply showing “popular” and “not popular” as the
ends of the ranges.
Differentiating between the domain popularity and PageRank
was challenging for all groups except the security ones (G2, G3).
Domain popularity made the most sense, likely because it is roughly
based on the number of people visiting the site, which is easy to
explain and understand. The concept of PageRank, however, was
much harder to grasp for participants even when verbally explained.
Also, the “domain” versus “page” difference was subtle leading to
difficulties articulating why a pagemight have a different popularity
from the domain.
Eliminating one or the other was also not an option as our se-
curity groups explicitly mentioned how useful it was to include
both since they are fundamentally different measures. For example,
sites like WordPress have high domain popularity even if a hosted
page has a low page rank. So it is possible for a very popular site to
be hosting an unpopular malicious page. To reduce confusion, we
iterated on the wording to improve section explanations. G8 in par-
ticular was shown several wording options and provided extensive
feedback on how to express the concepts more clearly. However,
even in the final design, the difference between domain popularity
and PageRank is still hard to grasp quickly.
Encryption. Initially we thought that encryption would be use-
ful information in the report. In the encryption component we
stated if the connection was encrypted or not. But we were also
concerned that user would equate encryption with owner validity,
so we added, “This URL is encrypted but we couldn’t verify the
owner”. G1 understood this concept and explained: “If this is an
Apple URL, you would expect to have a verified owner”.
However, we found that showing encryption information may
mislead users. For example, a G2 participant marked a legitimate
URL as phishing because she did not think a reputable company
would use a HTTP connection. When we tried incorporating own-
ership information as well to provide a more complete view of
encryption, participants just became more confused. A participant
from G4 asked “why is it a good sign if you cannot verify the
owner of the organization?” after seeing that the connection was
encrypted (green) but the website owner could not be verified due
to the information not being in the SSL/TLS certificate. Showing
information that could mislead the user violates our design goals D
of inspiring trust and C of confidence by showing correct infor-
mation that will lead to the right decision. Therefore, in line with
our design goal A to avoid overload, we removed encryption en-
tirely from the report. The only exception are Extended Validation
(EV) Certificates. These are TLS/SSL certificates which have gone
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through an extensive ownership verification process. When we en-
counter a EV we put a green check in the summary and a statement
like: “MoneyGram International Inc. verified its ownership of this
domain.” The focus groups liked this feature and found it helpful.
A member of G6 stated “that’s all I need”.
6.3.4 Ideas for Workflow Integration. Participants were en-
thusiastic about having easy access to the report and explained how
they would integrate it in their work flows. A G2 participant sug-
gested developing a browser plugin or email client, which shows an
option to “Look up this URL” when a user right-clicks on a URL and
would show the report in a new tab. They explained that a plugin
would be best for them as they thought people are “too lazy” to
visit a website. A G5 participant suggested providing the summary
for each link on a page automatically.
Figure 4: A G6 participant began designing a report showing
“safe”, “unsafe”, “doubtful” and adding an option for “more
details”.
Both G3 and G6 suggested a tiered design where initially only
limited data like a score or the summary is shown with an option
to view the full report (See Figure 5); possibly limiting the type and
detail of data depending if the user is novice or advanced, e.g. an IT
helpdesk employee. In G6, a participant suggested that they would
like to see a high level safety flag before seeing any reports (See
Figure 4): “Give me three flags (green-safe, red-blacklisted, yellow-
unsure), then give me the ability to drill down the summary and
if I want more details, give me a link to the webpage”. Adding the
high level estimate will not “overwhelm [them] with the details at
a starting point” when using everyday. This suggestion contributed
to the “report summary only” design we evaluate in later sections.
Figure 5: An example of how the report could be integrated
into a user’s workflow as suggested by G3 andG6. The image
shows a small circle flagging the URL and a version of the
report summary when hovering over the symbol with the
option of opening the full report.
6.4 Expert Interview
We showed an early version of the report to two experts who are
designing anti-phishing training for the University and responding
to requests regarding phishing from the front-line helpdesk. Overall,
they were very positive about the report design. Although they felt
that the report is too complex for average users, they thought that
it might be of great use to the help desk staff who has to handle
reports of potential phishing URLs.
We also asked them if there was any part of the report they felt
was unnecessary. They commented that the encryption component,
which we later removed, is not needed to judge if a URL was phish-
ing and will likely confuse users. Otherwise, they felt that all other
parts of the report were necessary to make an informed decision.
7 FEATURES VALIDATION
While the features selected for the report are known to be strong
phishing features, we still wanted to test the visual appearance of
the report on known phishing and safe URLs. We analyzed 6877
URLs from four data sets, two phishing (PhishTank [58], Open-
Phish [59]), and two safe (DMOZ [14], ParaCrawl [42]), to explore
what the report could realistically look like for users. The sets of
safe URLs contained 2615 URLs, of which 592 (23%) were excluded
due to ‘4xx’ and ‘5xx’ response codes. For phishing URLs, we col-
lected a total of 4262 URLs, of which 1645 (39%) were excluded due
to unsuccessful response codes. Phishing URLs from OpenPhish
and PhishTank were processed every two hours to extract features
while the pages were still live.
To reduce load on the reader, reports only include data relevant
to the particular URL. For example, tricks do not appear in every
URL, so we hide them by default and only show them if they are
present such as the presence of non-ASCII characters. So while
there are 23 possible rows, only 6.7 rows were shown on average
(Min = 4, Max = 10), with phishing (Mean = 6.8) and safe (Mean =
6.5) having similar row counts.
Tricks were rare for safe URLs with only 77 (3.8%) showing one
trick and the remainder having no tricks. Phishing URLs more
commonly had tricks with 868 (33.2%) containing between 1–3
tricks. The primary cause of tricks for safe URLs was the similarity
between the domain and one of top 10,000 popular domains (30
URLs), a phenomenon already seen in previous research [78]. Thus,
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we only show a yellow indicator for this feature to avoid false
positives and hand the task of comparing and deciding whether
this is expected in their context to the user.
Looking at the red color in the reports, 30.2% of safe URLs and
88.0% of phishing URLs had at least one red row. Of the safe URLs
with a red row, 99% did not appear in Google’s top 10 search re-
sults, causing the red. Search result may therefore vary a good bit,
making it a difficult feature to interpret. However, it is still a good
indicator for the illegitimacy of a page, which is why we decided
to keep it. We also found that 23.4% of phishing URL reports had
only green rows. Further examination showed that only three of
them were compromised websites, while the rest were URLs that
redirected to safe URLs; thus, the features referred to safe URLs
which were indeed safe. This redirection tactic is used by attackers
to serve advertisements and then send the user to the expected
safe website [77]. Therefore, it is important for the report to urge
users to visit the shown final link instead of the original one. We
also considered using the color frequency in each report to predict
whether a URL is safe or not. Applying linear regression, we found
that the frequency of each color in the report significantly predicts
whether a URL is safe or not (R2 = 0.44, F(4635) = 1238, p < .001)
with Red (β = −0.48, p < .001), Yellow (β = −0.17,p < .001), and
Green (β = 0.11,p < .001).
Finally, we measured the features’ redundancy to ensure we
are not showing unnecessary features. We computed pair-wise
correlations between features using their severity color as presented
to users as the feature’s value and found no correlation between
any of them.
8 ONLINE STUDY
Focus groups are an excellent way to get rich feedback but a poor
way to get a truly wide range of participants. To address that gap, we
decided to use an online survey to test the clarity of report content
as well as its ability to support users in making accurate safety
judgments about a URL. We used a between-subjects experimental
design where each participant saw one of: the full report, just the
summary, and just showing the URL with domain highlighting.
8.1 Questionnaire Instrument
For all conditions, the survey started with informed consent. Partici-
pants were then asked how familiar theywerewith 13website terms
and 6 companies followed by study instructions to not visit any of
the links and only read them. A question then tested whether they
had read the instructions and terminated the study if they failed it
twice. To test their existing URL-reading skills, participants were
then given three URLs and asked to choose which company those
URLs lead to. The first URL has Google in the pathname, the second
has Facebook in the subdomain part, and the third is for New York
Times which uses an abbreviation of the brand name.
Participants were then shown 6 URLs. For each URL, they were
told to imagine that they wanted to visit a particular company,
given a brief description of that company, for example, “eBay, an
auction and consumer to consumer sales website”, and then asked
if the URL “leads to a page owned by the above company or is it
a malicious URL”. In the domain highlighting condition the URL
was domain highlighted in the question, for the other conditions
a report was provided and participants were encouraged to use
it when answering. Participants were then asked how confident
they were in their decision followed by a question about what most
influenced their decision. After answering questions about all 6
URLs, all groups were asked a set of comprehension questions to
make sure they did, or could, understand the content of the report
or the report summary, the comprehension questions were multiple
choice and asked the participant what they thought the different
parts of the report meant. Full and control were asked about the full
report elements, and the report summary group was asked about
the report summary elements. The answer options were drawn
from common misunderstandings observed in the focus groups.
The survey ended by collecting background information. We used a
phishing susceptibility scale from Wright & Marett [87] with 5 sub-
scales to test participants’ computer self-efficacy, web experience,
trust, risk beliefs, and suspicion of humanity. Also, we included
basic demographics questions on age, gender, and highest degree
obtained.
8.1.1 Study conditions. In the following, we describe the condi-
tions and the questions that differed between them.
Domain highlighting: In this condition, we showed the full URL
with the domain highlighted and asked participants if the URL leads
to the given company name. Existing research already shows that
users cannot read URLs unaided [2, 4, 6, 69]. Domain highlighting
has already been adopted by several browsers, e.g. Safari, making it a
state-of-the-art approach that has been shown to help users decide
on URL safety [88]. Thus, we chose domain highlighting as the
control condition. To determine what most influenced participants’
safety judgments, they were asked to select up to three of: the
domain, the protocol (https), the URL path and query strings, their
prior knowledge, and their familiarity of the company’s URL.
Full report: This condition is the longest. Before showing the 6
URLs to participants, we first showed them a fictitious report with
obviously fake values and asked 10 questions in a random order
about the features, i.e., “How old is this website?”. Doing so gave
participants some basic practice with the report and allowed us to
test for any serious misunderstandings about how to use it.
To determine what most influenced the participants’ safety judg-
ments, they were shown a list of the different report elements along
with “my own prior experience reading URLs” and asked to select
up to three that most influenced their decision.
Finally, we asked a set of 7-point Likert assertion questions to
measure the report usefulness and satisfaction, loosely based on
the SUS, such as "I can learn a lot about phishing using this report"
and others drawn from focus group participants’ opinions about
the report. We ended with an optional free text comment section.
Report summary: Many participants in our focus groups sug-
gested to show the report summary when a user hovers over a
link. The idea has merit, so we evaluate it here as a middle option
between domain highlighting and showing the full report. Partici-
pants in this condition saw only the summary part of the report,
with no option to see the full report.
To determine what influenced the participants’ safety judgments
most, they were shown a list of answers including the summary
report boxes, elements of the URL, their own prior experience, and
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the colors. After answering questions for all 6 URLs, they were
asked about the meaning of each of the summary report elements,
with multiple choice answer options derived from common focus
group misconceptions and an other option. Finally, they were asked
the same 7-point Likert questions about the report usability as the
Full Report condition.
We categorized URLs into 3 reading difficulties levels: (1) Parse
and Match: any URL knowledgeable person can find the domain
and compare it to brand name, (2) Domain Knowledge: a URL
knowledgeable person has to know which organization a domain
belongs to before judging the URL, and (3) Misleading Flags: URLs
have information that may mislead participants to misjudge them.
For each category we have two organizations, one popular and
one not popular based on the top targeted domains on PhishTank,
and for each organization, we have a phishing and a safe URL (see
Table 3). With 6 organizations, we ended up with 12 URLs in total.
For each condition, participants were divided into two groups with
every group being shown one link of each organization at random,
six URLs in total.
The presented URLs are real-life URLs with the phishing taken
from our analyzed data set in Section 7. We made minor manipula-
tions to control some variables. They have an approximately similar
length, https protocol, as well as path and query strings. To reduce
a bias in the selected URLs, we ensured that the color indicators
were in-line with real observed color combinations from the data
set. As we had abnormal false positive search results, we included
one safe URL with a red search result. For participants’ safety, we
selected phishing URLs that were no longer active. Additionally, in
case they clicked on the links, we added a hyperlink which leads to
a page belonging to the research group about the danger of clicking
on these links.
8.2 Survey Results
Participants. We recruited participants from Prolific for a 30
minute study on phishing. The time estimate was based on a short
pilot study. We limited participants to those with approval rates
above 90% and Native English speakers to avoid language issues.
We then excluded those who did not answer the attention check
questions accurately.
We had a total of 153 participants (domain highlighting = 51,
report summary = 50, full report = 52), 63.4% were female. Partici-
pants had an average age of 31.89 years (σ = 9.9). Compensation
was £3.5. The average time required to complete the survey was
18.26 minutes. For the prior URL reading skill, on average 1.6 of
the questions were answered correctly with only 14 answering all
questions correctly (9%) and (15%) not answering any URL correctly.
Accuracy of safety judgment. We found that participants in gen-
eral were able to accurately judge URLs’ safety. The average ac-
curacy was highest for the full report (5.5/6, SD = .28), with the
report summary also doing well (4.96/6, SD = .38) and the domain-
highlight doing the worst (3.88/6, SD = .48). The false positive
(FPR) and false negative (FNR) rates are also encouraging with all
participants more likely to incorrectly mark safe URLs as phishing:
full report (FPR = .12, FNR = .05), report-summary (FPR = .23, FNR
= .11), and domain-highlight (FPR = .44, FNR = .26)).
We used an ANOVA followed by applying Cohen’s F for the
effect size to test if the three conditions (domain-highlight, full
report, and report summary) impacted the accuracy of participants’
judgments and we found a statistically significant impact of the
condition on the judgment accuracy (α = .01, p < .001, r = 0.29).
We then computed follow-up t-tests and found a significant dif-
ference between all three pairs of conditions: domain-highlight
and full report (p < 0.0001, d = 0.7) , domain-highlight and report-
summary (p < 0.0001,d = 0.4), and report-summary and full report
(p < 0.001, d = 0.3).
We separately tested if any other variables impacted accuracy
using ANOVA as well. These variables are the time spent on the
question, the condition, and the level of difficulty of each URL,
the actual safety (malicious/trustworthy), participants’ confidence
in their answer, their familiarity with the company, the company
the URL leads to, their prior knowledge of URL reading, and their
phishing susceptibility factors. We found that the accuracy of users’
judgments is significantly impacted by the condition, the URL safety,
and the URL hardness level (α = .01, p < .001), with a large effect
size for the condition (r = 0.31) and small for the other two (0.16
and 0.13). The remaining variables had no significant impact on
the judgment accuracy.
We tested URLs associated with 6 organizations as shown in
Table 3 where each organization had a phishing and safe URL
associated with it, resulting in 12 URLs tested. For all URLs, the
full report has higher accuracy than the domain highlighting. The
summary report is slightly mixed, mostly sitting between the do-
main highlighting and the full report, but occasionally showing
more accuracy than the full report. The four “parse and match”
URLs are theoretically the easiest to determine from only read-
ing the URL string, which is mostly born out with the high accu-
racy for even the domain highlighting condition. The exception,
bestchange.ru, was incorrectly marked as phishing by the majority
of participants in the domain-highlighting condition. For the “do-
main knowing” URLs, a user has to know the correct domain of the
organization to be able to accurately judge safety if unaided. Here
the email.microsoftonline.com URL was the most challenging for
all conditions. The bìttrêx.com URL was also challenging for the
domain highlighting group, possibly because they were unsure if
the non-ASCII character (Vietnamese) should be there or not. In the
misleading URLs, Tripod was a confusing case where the safe URL
positions the brand name in the subdomain while the phishing URL
includes the brand name in the domain but actually is a hosting
service for other websites. Similarly, the fb.me legitimate short URL
confused many of the domain-highlight participants.
Comprehension of the report elements. Full report participants
were able to provide a correct answer for 7.73 out of 10 report
comprehension questions on average.
The most common error was in regards to the location feature
where 57.7% (30/52) of participants indicated that the locationmeans
the physical location of the server they were contacting rather than
the self-reported location of the organization that registered the
domain.
PageRank continued to be a source of confusion with 34.62%
(18/52) of participants providing an incorrect answer. They com-
monly confused PageRank with domain popularity indicating that
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Table 3: The URLs used in the online study to judge URLs. Each condition was divided to two groups and see only one URL for
each company.
URL Hardness Popularity Safety Group % of participants who accurately judged safety
G1 G2 Highlight Full report Summary
https://resolutioncenter.ebay.com/policies/?id=123 Parse and match Popular Safe X 81 100 81
https://itmurl.com/www.ebay.co.uk/item=30327559652 Phish X 96 96 88
https://www.bestchange.ru/exchangers/mkt=en&id=234 Unpopular Safe X 44 88 83
https://www.bestcnange.ru/exchangers/mkt=en&id=234 Phish X 92 100 92
https//email.microsoftonline.com/login/?mkt=en-GB Domain knowing Popular Safe X 64 73 50
https://www.365onmicrosoft.com/login/?langua=en-GB Phish X 73 100 96
https://international.bittrex.com/account/?id=2423 Unpopular Safe X 73 85 65
https://international.bìttrêx.com/account/?id=2423 Phish X 56 96 92
https://fb.me/messages/t/788720331154519 Misleading flags Popular Safe X 15 92 85
https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2F67.23.238.165 Phish X 60 100 83
https://www.tripod.lycos.com/pricing/?plan=free-ad Unpopular Safe X 56 92 96
https://webmasterq.tripod.com/pricing?plan=free-ad Phish X 65 77 81
the value meant how popular the site was rather than the indi-
vidual page. One option we are considering for future work is to
hide PageRank when it is in alignment with the popularity (both
high or both low) and only show it when it is different with direct
explanations of how the miss-alignment could be problematic.
All questions in the section had an option to indicate that the
description was confusing. The web hosting element confused par-
ticipants most with 12% indicating that the description is unclear
and 73% (38/52) of them answering it correctly. The result suggests
that the new wording is mostly working though there is some room
for improvement.
In the summary group, participants were able to provide a cor-
rect answer for an average of 4.69 out of 6 questions. The most
common error concerned the web hosting feature with 57.7% (38/52)
answering correctly.
Report usefulness and satisfaction. We asked participants to pick
the report elements that they found most helpful after deciding
about each URL to get a sense of if they were relying on a small
set of features or using the whole report. Participants chose dif-
ferent information for different URLs. “Domain age” was the most
influential feature for 4/12 (eBay and Bittrex Safe URLs and eBay
and Microsoft Phish URLs), “Manipulation tricks” for 3/12 (Face-
book, Bittrex, and BestChange phishing URLs), “Domain popular-
ity” 4/12 (BestChange, Microsoft, Tripod and Facebook safe URLs),
and “Search result” for 1/12 (Tripod Phishing URL). For the safe
Microsoft URL, we displayed a warning that ‘microsoftonline’ is
similar to ‘Microsoft’ and it does not match Google’s top search re-
sults, however, it was still not the most helpful feature. The fact that
participants were looking at different elements for different URLs
shows that they were making use of the full report and balancing
and weighing features, instead of just sticking to the one aspect
that made the most sense to them. Participants indicated that they
used prior knowledge but it was not in the top three features for
any of the URLs.
The self-reported answers for satisfaction indicate that the full
report (Mean = 5.78,Median = 6, SD = 0.72) was more preferable
than the summary-report (Mean = 5.36,Median = 5.57, SD = 1.13).
For the full report, participants found that the survey taught them
about phishing, using the report would help them, they understand
the report content, and did not need to learn new skills to use it.
However, in the summary group, users felt they needed to learn a
lot of things before using the report.
9 LIMITATIONS
Our report aims to support users in deciding if potential phishing
URLs are or are not safe to click on. Therefore, our work is limited
to the types of information available to a user in advance of loading
the page itself and does not include solutions that look at the safety
of the resulting page such as identifying compromised code or
layouts that are visually similar to frequently targeted sites.
We endeavored to put together focus groups looking at HCI,
Security, and non-technical students to get a range of opinions and
experience. We also conducted multiple focus groups to offset some
of their known issues, such as participants getting distracted by
irrelevant topics, or being influenced by a dominant peers’ opinions.
We also ensured that a moderater was present to keep the groups
focused and on topic. Finally, we also used an online survey to
further verify our focus group findings on a large scale.
Prolific, similar to other onlinemicrowork sites, is known to have
users who are more computer literate than the average internet user,
they also tend to be more privacy aware [37] which may impact
their knowledge of URL reading. Though recent studies of online
workers suggest that online workers, including Prolific workers,
still struggle with predicting where a URL will go [2, 69]. This type
of user is also the type of person that less skilled people may go
to for assistance [56], so supporting them well is likely to have a
broader positive impact.
The phishing feature list we used is also not exhaustive. There
are a wide variety of features used to detect phishing URLs, and
many of them appear in only one or two papers. To mitigate the
issues, we made use of existing reviews of the range and accuracy
of features [5]. However, features that have been mostly tested on
automated systems are not necessarily the best features possible
for people. In this work we have started with known good features
and narrowed in on those that best support people, but it is possible
that other features exist that support people better but did not show
up in our review.
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10 DISCUSSION
URLs are known to be complicated for users to read unaided mak-
ing it challenging for them to accurately judge the safety of a URL,
even when they are aware of context like what website they expect
to visit. Our report design is intended to support users in mak-
ing informed decisions about URLs that they are concerned about.
While many users have access to some form of expert advice, either
through their employer’s help desk or through the help mecha-
nisms of the targeted company, that expert advice takes effort to
engage with and the response will likely be slow if it comes at all.
Our report is intended to help users help themselves when they
encounter a URL they consider suspicious by allowing them to
make use of many of the same data sources used by experts.
Our focus group participants were able to use the report by uti-
lizing their own contextual knowledge and their expectations of
the organization the URL represents. For every URL, they picked
a different feature that influenced their answers, giving them the
flexibility to decide what phishing feature is the right clue for each
case. Our online study showed similar findings with both the full
report and summary report conditions able to more accurately iden-
tify phishing URLs than users who only had domain highlighting
to help them. Online participants also made use of many elements
of the report to make their decisions, supporting the view of our
expert focus group participants that a large number of features
really is needed to accurately judge URL safety.
User Empowerment. In security work it is easy to take a paternal-
istic approach with end users where the security expert knows best,
gives users minimally explained rules to follow, then gets upset or
blames them when those rules are not followed as expected. Part
of the goal of this work is to shift that interaction to one where the
users are given more knowledge about the specific situation as well
as more control while also being asked to remember less facts and
rules. Ideally the report structure will also support user confidence
and fast feedback where if they think a URL is potentially unsafe,
they can quickly gain more information about it. While tools that
support users in making decisions about safety do exist, there are
few of them and they are mainly aimed at expert users who already
know terms like “domain”, most of the other tools instead focus
on providing users with binary decisions with minimal to no rea-
soning provided [1]. While the binary advice is what users would
like, having too many false positives also leads to users no longer
trusting tools [3], so such tools have to be careful about which URLs
they mark as unsafe.
Empowered users are also important because the context each
person works in is different making it nearly impossible to provide
one set of comprehensive rules that work well for everyone. The
behaviors of phishers also adapt and change over time [22]. Asking
users to keep all this information in their head is impossible [41],
but with the support of a tool, users can always be basing their
decision on up-to-date information and guidance. Over time they
may also start learning the tricks and indicators that are most useful
for the type of content they see.
Training. While the primary purpose of the report is decision
support, it is also has a potential for education. Existing education
approaches tend to focus on training the user either through a
dedicated up-front training [53, 85] or through smaller training
embedded in existing work practices. In both cases, a security pro-
fessional decides what is most important for the user to learn and
bases their training around that. The timing of the training is also
outside the user’s control, either dictated by the organization or
appearing in their normal work unasked for. The design of our
report is intended to fill a gap where instead of telling users what
and when they should learn about phishing, we instead wait till
they have a specific case that they would like to learn more about.
Similar to earlier work by Kumaraguru et al. [44], this type of train-
ing is timed at a teachable moment. But where earlier work has
focused on the moment after the user fell for a phishing attack, our
report instead focuses on a time point when the user is curious and
seeking advice.
Use Cases. The report is meant to support a user who has already
identified a potentially fraudulent URL, but is uncertain about it
and either does not have access to experts or does not have time
to wait for expert feedback. Our focus groups, however, also sug-
gested other uses cases, such as using it to help explain a safe/unsafe
decision to someone else. People often reach out to peers when
uncertain about potentially malicious communications [56, 66],
having a report like ours would enable people to provide not only
a recommendation but also a reason behind that recommendation.
Similarly, participants thought that the report might be useful for
help desk workers who may not be security experts, but are regu-
larly asked about potentially fraudulent communications. Such a
report might improve their ability to respond to requests accurately
as well as provide useful feedback to users. Finally, they suggested
adding this type of report to automated systems as a better way to
persuade users to adhere to the warning [67]. Several of these use
cases would be interesting to study in future work.
Focused Attention. Initially we set out to create a short and simple
report that users could easily use at a glance to understand the safety
of URLs. One hard lesson we have learned over the course of this
project is that URL safety is a complex topic. Many of the basic
concepts needed to understand the evidence require explanation for
an end user to be able to understand them and use the knowledge
correctly. Because the URLs being looked at are expected to have
already gone through a phishing filter, what the user needs the most
help with is comparing their own contextual knowledge, which
was not available to the automatic filter, to the information about
the URL. This type of comparison is necessary at this stage in the
process and requires focused attention from the user to accomplish
the task. Our report is designed to support users in this process by
clearly explaining the different elements, supporting comparisons,
and enabling users to more efficiently use the report on subsequent
accesses. However, it is important to recognize that the report is best
used in cases where the user is proactively seeking more knowledge
about a URL rather than pushing the report into their workflow
unasked for.
Deployment Potential. While the main contribution is the report
design itself, we also consider the practicalities of potentially im-
plementing and deploying it. In order to test the report content
with real data (See Section 7), we programmatically sourced the
feature data and computed what would be displayed in the report.
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Our code automatically queries several third party APIs, such as
PhishTank and Google Safe Browsing, to retrieve features not pos-
sible to extract from the URL itself. Using such APIs in a deployed
system would be practical since they are continuously updated and,
thus, require minimal to no ongoing maintenance for the report
accuracy. Other report elements like the tricks and the explanations
may require more expert involvement to maintain over time, but
the effort of doing so is not large. To further explore the potential
of deployment, a masters student build a prototype of the report
as a Chrome browser plugin as a thesis project [83]. Their system
allowed a user to request a variation of our report for any URL they
saw inside the browser. As the prototype was a proof-of-concept,
it is not suitable for real-world testing. But it did demonstrate the
feasibility of integrating such a report into common user tools, like
browsers.
11 CONCLUSION
We have presented the design for a new URL feature report which
assists users in deciding whether a URL is malicious or not. The re-
ports are intended for users who are trying to judge a URL’s safety
as part of a primary task. To refine the report’s design, we con-
ducted 8 focus groups with experts in HCI, experts in security, and
average users. Finally, we conducted a survey to measure the read-
ability and effectiveness of the report. We found that participants
could generally read the reports, understand phishing features, and
use them to successfully decide if a URL is malicious or safe. How-
ever, some participants still had difficulty understanding the more
complex concepts such as PageRank and location.
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